



America at Risk:

GOP Choices Leave Homeland Vulnerable

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JIM TURNER, RANKING MEMBER

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We are at war against al Qaeda. Usama Bin Ladin declared one year after 9/11 that his goal is to kill 4 million Americans. The Administration tells us regularly that al Qaeda may attack us anywhere, anytime – and admits we are not as safe as we must be. The bipartisan 9-11 Commission issued the same warning.

At this moment in our history, “business as usual” is not an option. Our terrorist enemies are not going to wait for us to gradually protect our homeland. We must do all we can – as fast as we can – to protect the United States from further terrorist attack.

The gap, however, between the rhetoric of protecting the homeland and the reality of a real commitment to protect the homeland is wide. The homeland security policies and priorities of the President and the Republican congressional leadership represent the wrong choices for America.

For example, while the President expresses pride in spending \$20 billion more on homeland security last year than in the year of 9/11, the President’s tax cuts gave the top 1 percent of American taxpayers – those making more than \$1 million a year – four times that amount – all while America is at war

The fact remains that we have not taken strong action in the wake of 9/11 to make our country safe from terrorist attack. Some examples include:

- America is not safe when we secured less nuclear material in Russia and around the world in the two years after 9/11 than in the two years before 9/11.
- America is not safe when we fail to install radiation detection monitors at all ports of entry and other critical sites.
- America is not safe when we fail to screen 100 percent of the cargo that travels on passenger planes.
- America is not safe when over 24,000 illegal immigrants from countries other than Mexico are caught but released into our communities because the Department of Homeland Security lacks detention space. Two years ago, on its website, al Qaeda took note of our porous borders.
- America is not safe when we screen only 5 percent of the 7 million maritime cargo containers that enter our country each year for weapons of mass destruction.
- America is not safe when 120,000 hours of terrorist-related wiretap information lies untranslated at the FBI.
- America is not safe when we fail to aggressively deal with the threat of biological weapons by pursuing a “Manhattan Project” to shorten the time between the discovery of a “bug” and the development of a drug or vaccine to counter it.

- America is not safe when our nation's first responders lack the ability and the equipment they need to talk to one another during an emergency.
- America is not safe when the Department of Homeland Security's own Inspector General has concluded that three years after 9/11 we still lack an integrated, comprehensive terrorist watch list.
- America is not safe when our border inspectors and police officers do not have access to the full range of information held by our government on terrorist suspects.
- America is not safe when we fail to protect the thousands of chemical plants that could serve as "pre-positioned toxic weapons of mass destruction" if hit with explosives by terrorists.

We can take decisive action to secure our homeland – we can win the war against our terrorist enemies. But it will require the right choices and the right priorities.

Three years after the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration and Republican Congress have not taken aggressive action to make America as safe as it needs to be. The Homeland Security Appropriations Act signed by the President today is another example of a missed opportunity to close the key security gaps facing America. The measure increases homeland security spending by only \$1 billion above last year – about the cost of one week in Iraq – and fails to provide adequate resources to fix critical security gaps, such as ensuring cargo containers are screened for weapons of mass destruction, interoperable communications equipment is available for our nation's first responders, adequate detention bed space exists for people who illegally cross our borders, and explosives detection equipment is installed at our nation's airports.

Below is a list of key homeland security gaps that continue to face America and an explanation of how Democrats would close them. A compilation of homeland security bills proposed by Democratic Members of the Select Committee on Homeland Security is also included.

Information Sharing and Terrorist Watch Lists

Homeland Security Gap:

- According to the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General, the U.S. government has an "ad hoc approach to watch list consolidation" and the "absence of central leadership" has prevented "successful accomplishment of the goal."¹
- We still do not have a fully functioning, comprehensive terrorist watch list.²
- The failure to share information was the key intelligence failure before September 11.³ Yet, we have not built the type of comprehensive information system recommended by outside experts, such as the Markle Foundation.⁴

- According to Department of Justice's Inspector General, the FBI has failed to translate 120,000 hours of wiretaps on terrorist suspects.⁵
- The Government Accountability Office reported this summer that the Department of Homeland Security has not developed a plan that "describes how it will carry out its information-sharing responsibilities and/or how it will address the many identified challenges that exist in building a public/private information-sharing partnership."⁶

Democrats Would:

- Strengthen efforts to create a comprehensive terrorist watch list and provide access to watch list information to all personnel responsible for screening operations such as border and transportation security officers.
- Use existing technology and strong privacy controls to create an information-sharing network to provide access to intelligence and other terrorism-related information to government officials and other people involved in preventing a terrorist attack.
- Hire sufficient personnel to translate and analyze terrorism-related intelligence.
- Develop and implement a plan that sets forth information sharing responsibilities between the federal government and private sector.

Securing Nuclear Material

Homeland Security Gap:

- Although the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of a terrorist organization is the greatest threat to our national security, we have secured less nuclear materials in Russia and around the world in the two years after 9/11 than we secured in the two years before 9/11.⁷
- Liability and access concerns have been blocking progress on securing nuclear materials in Russia.⁸ Republican Senator Pete Domenici stated that the chief Administration official assigned to resolve this problem was not "up to" the job and commented that he was "amazed that the leadership of the United States and Russia cannot resolve this issue."⁹
- In June, 2004, the prestigious Defense Science Board concluded that the United States has done very little to defend against the threat of a clandestine nuclear and radiological attack.¹⁰

Democrats Would:

- Enforce the Global Threat Reduction Initiative by requiring nuclear and radiological materials at the 24 most vulnerable foreign reactor sites to be secured or disposed of by 2009, and authorize \$4.5 billion for these purposes.
- Resolve the longstanding liability and access problems with Russia that have prevented the largest stocks of weapons and materials to be secured.
- Address the serious threat posed by radiological dispersal devices (RDD), or “dirty bombs,” by increasing resources to secure, consolidate, or dispose of potential RDD weapons sources, conduct a threat assessment to identify likely source materials, and strengthen international licensing rules.

Bioterrorism and Infectious Disease Threats

Homeland Security Gap:

- Well before the anthrax attacks of 2001, experts warned that biological weapons could serve as the ideal weapon of terror, easily spreading fear and confusion, capable of causing mass casualties, and difficult to trace.¹¹ U.S. officials believe that al Qaeda is pursuing sophisticated biological weapons¹² and a United Nations panel recently declared it is “just a matter of time” before al Qaeda attempts a biological or chemical attack.¹³
- According to biodefense experts, the United States still does not have a coherent biodefense strategy.¹⁴ “There is still an absence of a clearly empowered federal authority to provide national leadership on the spectrum of issues related to securing America against bioattacks.”¹⁵ “While there has been some effort to develop parts of a comprehensive plan, the planning process has not been inclusive, and the communication of what has been proffered has fallen far short of what is needed.”¹⁶
- Project Bioshield does not go far enough to protect America from bioterrorism. In a report released just this month, scientific experts determined that “the measures the U.S. government has taken to date, including the passage of Bioshield legislation, will not be enough to entice pharmaceutical industry leaders into the field and will not produce the countermeasures that nation needs for a truly effective biodefense.”¹⁷
- In 2000, the Defense Science Board determined we had only 1 of the 57 countermeasures we need against the top 19 bioterror pathogens. Today we have 2.¹⁸
- Today, the nation is suffering from a massive flu vaccine shortage because we rely on a 50 year-old production technology that has no surge capacity and requires months to deliver vaccine.¹⁹

- The Department of Health and Human Services has stated that the Strategic National Stockpile should contain enough vaccine for 25 million people.²⁰ However, even though this nation was attacked with anthrax three years ago, the stockpile only has enough anthrax vaccine for 500 people, less than 1/100th of what is needed.²¹

Democrats Would:

- Require a comprehensive biodefense strategy for the nation. The strategy would require clear descriptions of :
 - The biological threats to the nation and how the government plans to defend against those threats;
 - The roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local government agencies;
 - Mechanisms of coordination and communication between agencies;
 - Performance benchmarks and timelines to achieve biodefense objectives.
- Broaden Project Bioshield to include all serious infectious disease threats including influenza, and strengthen cooperation between homeland security planners, health officials, regulators, and private sector drug and vaccine developers.
- Build capacity and coordinate communications between doctors and health researchers to deliver medical discoveries and breakthroughs rapidly during an epidemic or outbreak.
- Focus biomedical researchers and regulators on the goal of reducing the high costs and long timeframe for drug and vaccine development - typically requiring \$800 million over 14 years – in order to better respond to natural and manmade biological threats.

Port Security

Homeland Security Gap:

- The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security recently issued a report stating “improvements are needed in the inspection process to ensure weapons of mass destruction or other implements of terror do not gain access to the U.S. through oceangoing cargo containers.”²⁵ The Department of Homeland Security inspects only about five percent of the 7 million maritime cargo containers that enter our country every year for weapons of mass destruction.²⁶
- The Department of Homeland Security states that it inspects 100 percent of all “high risk” cargo, yet the Administration’s system for identifying such cargo is based on unreliable data.²⁷
- Most ports still do not have the ability to detect a nuclear or dirty bomb, even though the technology exists. The House Appropriations Committee reported that the

Administration's fiscal year 2005 budget provided for 165 new radiation portal monitors to screen cargo containers but admitted that "over a thousand" more are needed.²⁸

- In March, 2004, the head of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Robert Bonner, promised that radiation portal monitors would be deployed at "all port terminals receiving waterborne cargo." Today, the systems are operational at only four major ports.²⁹
- Many ports are not secure because they have not been provided with adequate resources to implement security measures. A total of \$537 million is required to equal what the Coast Guard says is needed this year alone; over the next 10 years, the shortfall stands at \$4.6 billion, according to the Coast Guard.³⁰
- While the Department of Homeland Security has several initiatives dedicated to checking containers overseas and examining the security of companies' supply chains, these programs are ineffective because they lack the personnel to conduct robust inspections. For example, only 300 of the 7,000 participants in the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) have had their security practices verified, leaving thousands of companies receiving the benefit of reduced inspections without demonstrating progress on security.³¹
- The Coast Guard's fleet of cutters and aircraft used to protect the homeland are old and at their breaking point. The Administration's budget, however, will not complete the replacement of Coast Guard assets until 2024.³²

Democrats Would:

- Immediately deploy radiation portal monitors at all ports and land border ports of entry.
- Require the Department of Homeland Security to establish standards and a verification process to ensure containers are secure.
- Require Customs and Border Protection to complete Customs and Trade Partnership verifications by the end of next fiscal year, ensuring companies are securing their supply chains.
- Authorize \$537 million dollars in fiscal year 2005 for port security grants.
- Accelerate the completion of the Coast Guard's Deepwater program from 22 to 10 years, giving the service modern cutters and aircraft to secure America's ports and coastline.

Border Security

Homeland Security Gap:

- An independent panel of experts appointed by the Department of Homeland Security reported that more than 70 percent of the 166 land ports of entry have inadequate infrastructure.³³
- Despite the increased threats and emphasis placed on border security since 2001, the number of Border Patrol agents has only increased by 3 percent per year.³⁴ Although the Patriot Act required thousands more customs and immigration inspectors to be stationed at the Northern Border, the Administration has still not met the statutorily-defined personnel goals.³⁵
- In fiscal year 2004, over 24,000 OTMs (“Other Than Mexicans”) were released into the United States because of a shortage of detention facility bed space.³⁶ Of those released, 80-90 percent never return for deportation proceedings.³⁷ Thousands of additional beds are needed, yet the Administration’s fiscal year 2005 budget requests only enough funds for 117 new beds.³⁸
- According to *Time*, for every one illegal immigrant that is caught, three cross undetected into the United States.³⁹ Technology has long been recognized as a force-multiplier.⁴⁰ Monitoring technologies currently exist to identify threats coming across our borders but the Department of Homeland Security has not made the commitment to fully deploy the technology.

Democrats Would:

- Create a \$1 billion infrastructure investment fund to enhance and facilitate security and commerce at our nation’s ports of entry.
- Ensure we have adequate Customs and Border Protection personnel and Border Patrol officers deployed along our borders, to include reaching Patriot Act levels for the Northern Border.
- Increase bed space and personnel for Detention and Removal Operations.
- Require the Department of Homeland Security to deploy monitoring technology along the entire Southern border to ensure it is monitored 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Aviation Security

Homeland Security Gap:

- Despite spending more than \$3 billion per year on passenger and baggage screening,⁴¹ The Transportation Security Administration screeners miss a shockingly high number of items that could threaten the safety of airline passengers, recently reported to be nearly 25 percent at one airport.⁴²
- The Transportation Security Administration has not provided screeners with the training they need to improve performance,⁴³ and Congress has levied an arbitrary cap on the number of screeners, which puts pressure on them to take shortcuts.⁴⁴ Very few of our airports have the most up-to-date explosive detection equipment – estimates are that an additional \$4 billion may be needed.⁴⁵
- Only a small percentage of the cargo that is placed on passenger planes is inspected for explosives.⁴⁶
- Only a small percentage, reported to be roughly 5 percent, of U.S. flights carry a federal air marshal.⁴⁷ The President's budget request for fiscal year 2005 would have underfunded air marshal personnel levels by \$50 million.⁴⁸

Democrats Would:

- Require, and adequately fund, 100 percent screening of air cargo that travels on passenger planes.
- End the Transportation Security Administration screener cap, authorize enough screeners to fully staff security checkpoints, and improve screener training.
- Expedite and increase funding for the deployment of new explosive detection systems capable of finding explosives hidden on passengers, and improving screener's ability to find weapons in checked or carry-on baggage.

Rail Security

Homeland Security Gap:

- Public transportation, including mass transit and rail, has been the single most common type of target of terrorist attacks worldwide.⁴⁹ More than nine billion passenger trips are made on mass transit in the United States each year, with the majority being in areas designated as high threat urban areas.⁵⁰
- Major rail and transit systems have estimated billions are needed for better communications, surveillance systems, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

detection, and personnel training.⁵¹ The Department of Homeland Security, however, has provided only \$115 million in rail grants over the past two years.⁵²

- Homeland Security Subcommittee Chairman Harold Rogers commented that the Administration's budget "marginalize[d]" rail and other non-aviation modes of transportation.⁵³
- In 2003, the Government Accountability Office recommended that the Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Transportation "develop a risk-based plan that specifically addresses the security of the nation's rail infrastructure" and "establish time frames for implementing specific security actions."⁵⁴ Such a plan has still not been developed.

Democrats Would:

- Create a \$2.8 billion grant program to fund the most pressing needs for passenger rail and public transit security. Eligible investments would include priority projects identified by public transportation authorities, such as:
 - Cameras and other surveillance equipment;
 - Explosive and WMD detectors;
 - Additional training and exercise support; and
 - Capital improvements to increase the security of stations, vehicles, bridges, and tunnels.
- Require the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Department of Transportation, to develop a risk-based, comprehensive, national strategic plan for the security of the nation's rail and other public transport systems.
- Ensure that the Department of Homeland Security develops and distributes best practices for rail transportation security to owners and operators of transit systems.
- Take concrete steps to increase awareness of measures the public, passengers, and public transport employees can take to improve transportation security.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Homeland Security Gap:

- According to the Homeland Security Act, the Department of Homeland Security is required to comprehensively assess critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, prioritize protective measures, develop a comprehensive national plan for securing critical infrastructures, and craft policy to protect critical infrastructure. To date, the Department's creation of an asset list has been ineffective, with both Republicans and Democrats calling it a "joke."⁵⁵

- This past week, the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection said that implementation of a national infrastructure protection plan is two to three years away.⁵⁶
- According to the Government Accountability Office, none of the Administration's homeland security strategies "indicates milestones" or "establishes performance measures" by which to measure or establish accountability for critical infrastructure protection.⁵⁷

Democrats Would:

- Implement a comprehensive national plan for securing critical infrastructures as quickly and effectively as possible. .
- Create a critical asset list that is complete and contains the adequate input of private sector and local officials.

Chemical Plants

Homeland Security Gap

- Chemical plants have been characterized as "pre-positioned weapons of mass destruction" and the FBI has described the terrorist threat as "both credible and real."⁵⁸
- A 2002 study by the Brookings Institution concluded that an attack on a chemical facility ranked second only to a biological or nuclear attack in terms of possible fatalities.⁵⁹
- The Department of Homeland Security has identified over 4,000 chemical plants that present a threat to the surrounding communities.⁶⁰ The Environmental Protection Agency has identified over 100 facilities that could harm over a million people.⁶¹
- Security at plants is weak. In an investigative report, *60 Minutes* revealed chemical plants in major metropolitan areas with unlocked gates, absent guards, broken fences, and unprotected chemical tanks.⁶²
- The Administration has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of chemical plant vulnerabilities. In September, Secretary Ridge testified that the Department of Homeland Security officials have visited only "a couple dozen" plants.⁶³
- So far, the nation has relied almost exclusively on voluntary industry efforts to improve chemical plant security. But the Government Accountability Office has stated that "no federal oversight or third party verification ensures that voluntary industry assessments are adequate and that necessary corrective actions are taken."⁶⁴

- Even though both EPA and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the chemical industry itself, have called on Congress to pass legislation to ensure security, Republican leaders in the House of Representatives have refused to hold a single hearing on the issue.⁶⁵ As a result, bipartisan chemical security legislation has been left to die in Committee for the second Congress since 9/11.⁶⁶

Democrats Would:

- Pass common-sense chemical security legislation that requires high-risk facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments, develop security plans, and implement security upgrades.
- Direct the Department of Homeland Security to review assessments and security plans developed by the industry and conduct inspections to ensure adequate security at chemical plants.
- Require facility owners to consider the use of alternative approaches, including using less hazardous chemicals and processes, in order to reduce the attractiveness of chemical plants to terrorists.

Cybersecurity

Homeland Security Gap:

- According to a recent survey conducted by the Pew Internet and American Life Project, almost half of Americans fear terrorists will launch cyberattacks on our critical infrastructures, disrupting major services and crippling economic activity.⁶⁷
- Congress' annual analysis of the security of government computers had eight critical agencies, including the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Energy, and State, receiving a failing grade on the security of their computer network systems. The Department of Homeland Security received the worst grade of any agency – 34 out of 100.⁶⁸
- In the past two years, the top three cybersecurity officials in the government have departed, the last after only a year on the job, giving less than one day's notice of his resignation. Cybersecurity in the government is now being lead by a part-time contractor and a detailee, neither of who are paid by the federal government.⁶⁹
- Worldwide losses from cyberattacks will swell to an estimated \$16.7 billion by the close of the year, up from \$3.3 billion in 1997.⁷⁰

Democrats Would:

- Prioritize cybersecurity within the federal government by creating an Assistant Secretary of Cybersecurity who has the authority and responsibility to lead the government's effort and effectively work with the private sector.
- Provide the necessary funds for developing programs and regional laboratories at universities, colleges, and community colleges to educate information technology professionals about cybersecurity, as well as reach out to consumers and small businesses.
- Provide adequate support and resources to the agencies tasked with the government's cybersecurity research and development efforts, as well as provide funding to academia to develop cybersecurity programs and technologies that can be shared among government, universities, and the private sector.

First Responder Preparedness

Homeland Security Gap:

- Enabling first responders to communicate during emergencies is one of the nation's top preparedness goals. Yet, the Administration requested no specific grant funds for fiscal year 2005 for enhancing interoperable communications.⁷¹ Solving this problem nationwide may cost between \$7-18 billion – the Administration has devoted a total of only \$231.5 million for interoperable communications grants over the past two years.⁷²
- Homeland security grants are not distributed based on risk – Wyoming receives \$38 per person in federal dollars, while New York receives only \$5.⁷³
- The Council on Foreign Relations has reported that America may fall approximately \$98.4 billion short of meeting critical emergency responder needs over the next five years if current funding levels are maintained.⁷⁴ Yet, according to data compiled by the Republican Staff of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, the Administration's budget cut government-wide first responder funding by \$1.9 billion, a 26 percent reduction, from amounts provided the previous year.⁷⁵
- Analysis by the International Association of Chiefs of Police shows that the Administration's proposed fiscal year 2005 funding levels for the Department of Homeland Security and Justice assistance programs for our first responders in law enforcement was \$3.3 billion, a reduction of \$1.6 billion or 32 percent from the combined fiscal year 2004 level of \$4.9 billion. This represents the first decline in overall law enforcement assistance funding since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.⁷⁶

- The 9-11 Commission report demonstrated that many tenants of the World Trade Center were unprepared for a catastrophic event. Although nearly 85 percent of the critical infrastructure of our country is owned and operated by the private sector, the Administration has not adopted a national standard for private sector preparedness to guarantee the safety of all Americans.⁷⁷

Democrats Would:

- Establish a new grant program, authorized at \$5 billion over 5 years, dedicated to achieving communication interoperability nationwide, and replace the ineffective interagency group (Project SAFECOM) that currently oversees federal interoperability efforts with a unified office within the Department of Homeland Security to work with federal, state, local stakeholders to develop and implement a national strategy to achieve interoperability.
- Allocate \$3.4 billion for first responder funding in fiscal year 2006, an increase of \$1 billion above the current year level. Reform first responder grant programs to ensure that all funding is allocated based on an assessment of the risks and vulnerabilities faced by our communities, and provide our communities with the necessary funding to meet their needs for essential terrorism preparedness capabilities.
- Require the Department of Homeland Security to develop and implement a comprehensive program to enhance private sector preparedness for emergencies and disasters that follows the guidance already developed by the American National Standards Institute, and, for the first time, implements national standards for private sector emergency preparedness.

Privacy and Civil Liberties

Homeland Security Gap:

- The Markle Foundation's report, "Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security," released in December 2003, found that the government lacks a "systematic effort to consider the privacy implications of [its] proposed programs or to develop an overall policy framework that would govern the deployment of new technologies."⁷⁸
- The Department of Homeland Security scrapped its Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening II (CAPPS II) after the Government Accountability Office and others demonstrated that it lacked safeguards and infringed on privacy.⁷⁹
- The federal government has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of the use of new technologies and privacy in almost 30 years, since the "U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission" was dismantled in 1977.⁸⁰

- The Administration does not have a single office within the federal government responsible for evaluating privacy issues. The White House privacy czar position that existed in previous administrations has been dismantled and little effort has been made to ensure that agencies have designated officials to review privacy issues.⁸¹
- The 9-11 Commission found that “at this time of increased and consolidated government authority, there should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties.”⁸²

Democrats Would:

- Create a Commission on Privacy, Freedom, and Homeland Security to look at wide-scale issues of how the government protects privacy in the information age.
- Create a Chief Privacy Officer for the federal government and require each federal agency to designate a privacy official.
- Create a Civil Liberties Board within the Executive Branch – consistent with the recommendation of the 9-11 Commission.
- Strengthen the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and require the Inspector General’s office to designate a specific person to be responsible for civil rights and civil liberties.

Democratic Legislation to Secure America

WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR ACT (H.R. 5291)

Introduced by Rep. Jim Turner

- Augments our ability to fight terrorists by increasing the size of the Special Forces;
- Increases our protection against terrorists by enhancing and strengthening border security, rail security, port and cargo security, aviation security, chemical plant security, cyber security, defense against bioterrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, private sector preparedness, communication interoperability, information sharing, and protection of civil rights and civil liberties;
- Prevents the rise of future terrorists through comprehensive international economic, educational, and public diplomacy programs.

SAFE PLANES ACT (H.R. 4312)

Introduced by Rep. Edward J. Markey

- Requires the Department of Homeland Security to establish and begin implementing a program to fully inspect all cargo on passenger aircraft;
- Requires hardened cockpit doors for all overflights of U.S. territory;
- Requires all terminal airport workers to go through screening and background checks before entering secure areas.

SECURE COASTS ACT (H.R. 4355)

Introduced by Rep. Loretta Sanchez

- Develops security standards for all containers entering U.S. ports;
- Requires inspections to ensure all shippers comply with security practices;
- Increase port security grants by a total of \$537 million for this fiscal year;
- Increases the strength of the U.S. Coast Guard to 50,000 and accelerates the modernization of the Coast Guard's fleet of ships and aircraft twice as fast as current plans (from 22 years to 10 years).

SECURE BORDERS ACT (H.R. 5130)

Introduced by Rep. Jim Turner

- Strengthens border security at and between our ports of entry by creating a \$1 billion infrastructure investment fund to enhance and facilitate security and commerce
- Mandates deployment of monitoring technology along the entire Southern border 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
- Authorizes funding to double staffing for Customs and Border Protection personnel
- Requires development of an inter-agency National Land Border Security Strategy
- Enhances penalties for organized alien smuggling, gives law enforcement tools to go after alien smuggling rings and expands Detention and Removal Operations

SAFE TRAINS ACT (H.R. 4361)

Introduced by Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton

- Creates a \$2.8 billion grant program to strengthening security on American passenger trains and transit lines;
- Increases security of stations, vehicles, bridges, and tunnels;
- Requires increased emergency training exercises, and boosts explosive and weapons of mass destruction detection and countermeasure capabilities.

RAPID CURES ACT (H.R. 4258)

Introduced by Rep. Jim Turner

- Develops a national plan to shorten from years to months the time from detection of a disease to its treatment and cure;
- Speeds development of clinical trial protocols for vaccines during a national health crisis.

CONNECT FIRST RESPONDERS ACT (H.R. 4400)

Introduced by Rep. Nita M. Lowey

- Establishes a new grant program, authorized at \$5 billion over 5 years, dedicated to achieving communication interoperability nationwide;
- Replaces the ineffective interagency group (Project SAFECOM) that currently oversees federal interoperability efforts with a unified office within the Department of Homeland Security to work with federal, state, local stakeholders to develop and implement a national strategy to achieve interoperability.

PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS ACT (H.R. 4830)

Introduced by Rep. Jim Turner

- Requires the Department of Homeland Security to develop and implement a comprehensive program to enhance private sector preparedness for emergencies and disasters;
- Identifies specific elements of this preparedness program, consistent with guidance issued by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA);
- Requires the Department of Homeland Security to develop and regularly update national voluntary consensus standards for private sector emergency preparedness.

SECURE VISA WAIVER ACT (H.R. 4550)

Introduced by Rep. Jim Turner

- Requires foreign visitors on the Visa Waiver Program to be electronically checked against terrorist watch lists and government databases before being permitted to travel to the United States;
- Extends the deadline for countries to develop passports with biometric identifiers by one year.

SHIELD PRIVACY ACT (H.R. 4414)

Introduced by Rep. Kendrick B. Meek

- Creates a bi-partisan Commission on Privacy, Freedom and Homeland Security to study and report on how efforts to improve homeland security are done in a way that is consistent with the protection of civil liberties and fundamental freedoms
- Creates a Chief Privacy Officer for the federal government and places Privacy Officers within federal agencies to ensure citizens rights are protected

CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTION ACT (H.R. 5182)

Introduced by Rep. Bennie G. Thompson

- Strengthens oversight responsibilities of the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties;
- Ensures Department compliance with Constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements;
- Designates a senior officer within the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General's office to investigate alleged abuses.

CYBER SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT (H.R. 5068)

Co-Introduced by Rep. Zoe Lofgren

- Creates an Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity within the Department of Homeland Security to establish and manage a national cybersecurity response system
- Establishes a national cybersecurity threat and vulnerability reduction program, and a national cybersecurity awareness and training program

Democratic Homeland Security Oversight Reports

Winning the War on Terror

Jim Turner, Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, released a plan to eliminate the threat of al-Qaeda to the United States. The 90-page document includes over 100 specific recommendations that should be implemented to position the United States for victory in the war against terrorism.

America at Risk: Closing the Security Gap

This comprehensive report acknowledges that although the United States is safer than it was before September 11, significant security gaps remain. This 135-page report identifies shortcomings in our homeland security efforts and recommends specific actions to ensure America is as safe as it can be from terrorist attack.

Transforming the Southern Border: Providing Security and Prosperity in the Post-9/11 World

This 130-page report, calls for the transformation of the U.S. Southern Border to enhance security and promote economic prosperity. A result of 6 months of staff investigations and visits to border communities, this report highlights the many security gaps that exist on the southern border and offers policy recommendations to close them.

Beyond Anthrax: Confronting the Future Biological Weapons Threat

The Rapid Cures Act was accompanied by this new report which shows that advances in biotechnology can make existing bioterrorism countermeasures obsolete. The report finds that a rapid "bug to drug" capability is needed to counter this threat.

A Biodefense Failure: The National Smallpox Vaccination Program One Year Later

One year after the initiation of the National Smallpox Vaccination Program, this report outlines how the program has failed and has left the United States unprepared to handle a major smallpox bioterror attack.

Keeping Terrorists Out of America by Unifying Terrorist Watch Lists: Ten Requirements for an Effective Terrorist Screening Center

The failure to share information was a key intelligence error in the events leading to September 11, yet a fully functioning, comprehensive terrorist watch list still does not exist. This report details what is needed to ensure this essential counter terrorism tool is as effective as it needs to be.

America at Risk: Closing the Public Transportation Security Gap

This report accompanied the Safe TRAINS Act to outline the vulnerabilities in US passenger rail systems and the policy recommendations to address them.

Securing Our Homeland, Strengthening Our Liberties

The SHIELD Privacy Act was accompanied by this new report which outlines ways to strengthen homeland security by protecting privacy and civil liberties.

America at Risk: Closing the Port Security Gap

This report accompanied the introduction of the Secure COAST Act, detailing vulnerabilities faced at U.S. ports and policy recommendations to address them.

America at Risk: Closing the Aviation Security Gap

This report accompanied the introduction of the Safe PLANES Act, detailing vulnerabilities that still exist in the aviation sector and policy recommendations to address them.

America at Risk: The State of Homeland Security

Democrats introduced the initial findings of a report detailing how the Bush Administration has failed to take aggressive action to protect the homeland.

Democratic Strategy on Homeland Security Making America Safer: Closing the Security Gap

Democrats introduced this plan in September, 2003, calling on the Administration to fulfill its commitment to the American people to secure the homeland.

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